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IN THE SUPRF.ME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORATION 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
v. 
BETTY J. BLACK, individually 
and as personal representative 
of the estate of Don J. Black, 
and DON J. BLACK REALTY, INC., 
Defendants-Respondents 
CASE NO. 16610 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Many of the statements contained in the Brief of 
Appellant and the Brief of Defendants-Respondent as to the fact 
in this case are undisputed; however, a careful examination of' 
affidavits which are the source of the facts in this case revea 
that in several respects defendant's Statement of the Facts is 
inaccurate. 
The most serious misstatement of the facts contained'. 
defendants' Brief arises in the context of defendants' insister 
that the only agreement between the parties relating to partia
1 
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that Utah Mortgage was free to release or to not release, as it 
saw fit. (See Brief of Defendants-Respondent, pp. 3-5, 17-18.J 
There are four references to partial releases in the 
Record. The first of these is contained in the Trust Deed itself 
in paragraph B.4. which states that upon request of Utah Mortgage 
the trustee may "reconvey without warranty all or any part of said 
property." (R. 17.) 
The remaining references to the agreement are found in 
the Anderson, Fry and Newman affidavits (R. 25, 29 and 30.) Mr. 
Anderson's affidavit sets forth the following information as to 
the loan agreement: 
6. At the time it made the loan Utah Mortgage 
agreed with the Blacks and Black Realty that it 
would give a partial release as to individual lots 
in the proposed subdivision upon payment of 
$5,200.00 per lot. This release price represented 
approximately 115% of the prorata value of each 
lot based upon the loan amount. The release price 
was later raised to $5,500.00. (R. 26.) 
Correspondingly, the affidavit of John D. Fry states: 
2. As part of the loan, Mr. and Mrs. Black 
requested that Utah Mortgage agree to release 
single lots from the Trust Deed upon payment of 
the sum of $5,200.00. This, Utah Mortgage agreed 
to do. (R. 29.J 
Finally, the affidavit of Robert A. Newman provides the following 
information as to the lot release agreement: 
2. Although the facts surrounding the release of 
lots varied with each sale, typically a buyer 
-2-
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wisning to purchase one of tne Brook Hollow lots 
would pay the lot release price into escrow with a 
title insurance company as part of his closing. 
His title insurance company would then forward the 
$5,200.00 or $5,500.00 release price to us. Upon 
receipt of the release price, we instructed the 
trustee under tne Trust Deea to execute a partial 
reconveyance as to the particular lot. All of the 
Black lots were released in this manner. (R. 30.) 
It is clear from the above statements from the affida':. 
of Messrs. Anderson, Fry and Newman that quite apart from the 
language in the Trust Deed which permitted Utah Mortgage to mal.• 
partial reconveyances of the property, there existed a separatE 
agreement between the parties which required Utah Mortgage to 
release inaividual lots in the suodivision upon payment of 
$5,200.00 and tnat this lot release price was subsequently raiE 
by agreement of the parties to $5,500.00. Thus, Mr. Anderson': 
Affiaavit makes reference to the fact that "Utah Mortgage agw 
with the Blacks and Black Realty tnat it would give a partial 
release as to individual lots in the proposed subdivision upon 
payment of $5,200.00 per lot." (R. 26.) And Mr. Fry states tt 
the Blacks "requested that Utah Mortgage agree to release sing! 
lots from the Trust Deed upon payment of the sum of $5,200.00 
" and that Utah Mortgage agreed to do so. (R. 29.) 
Notwithstanding the clear language of the affidavits' 
set forth above, defendants characterize Utah Mortgage as bein; 
"free to set any release price it chose", and to "have withhelc 
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even nigher release price, had it so desired". (Brief of 
Defendants-Respondent, p. 4.) Similarly, defendants state that 
"Utah Mortgage's right to demand any payment it chose as a 
condition of releasing lots was unrestricted 
." and that "[i)t 
could and did vary the release price to suit its perception of 
necessary cash flow." (Brief of Defendants-Respondent, p. 5.) 
A more accurate statement of the facts as set forth in 
the affidavits would appear to be that an agreement of some type 
existed between the parties as to partial releases of the lots, 
that the agreement, although not set forth in detail in the 
record, required that Utah Mortgage release lots to the defendants 
upon their tender of an agreed-upon sum, and that at some point in 
time, for unknown reasons, the release price was increased from 
$5,200.00 to $5,500.00. 
A second misstatement of the facts occurs in defendants' 
Statement as to the sufficiency of the release price to pay off 
the outstanding indebtedness under the note. Thus, defendants 
state that "[a] release price of even $5,200.00 per lot would have 
been more than sufficient to retire the loan, had it been 
collected." (Brief of Defendants-Respondent, p. 5.) It should be 
noted that this statement is not taken from the facts as set forth 
in any of the affidavits, but rather is an interpolation of 
certain figures found in the affidavit of Craig D. Anderson. 
-4-
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Mr. Anderson states in his Aff1oavit that Utah Mortgage loan~ 
defendants the sum of $675,715.00, or 75% of the appraised val, 
of the land and that the release price of $5,200.00 represente· 
"approximately 115% of the prorata value of each lot". (R. 21, 
26.) Defendants apparently conclude from these figures that~ 
each lot been released for the $5,200.00 or $5,500.00 release 
pr ice, the loan would have been paid well before all of the lot 
had been released. Such a conclusion overlooks the fact thatt 
loan oalance could have been increased by subsequent advances, 
payment of which would still be secured by the Trust Deed. (~ 
the third paragraph of the Trust Deed which states that the 
instrument is given to secure not only payment of the principa: 
and interest due on to the note, but to secure payment of all i 
expended by the beneficiary or trustee pursuant to their right' 
under the Trust Deed. (R. 16.)) That such advances were made 
apparent from the following statement by Mr. Anderson in h~ 
affidavit: 
7. Because of various cost overruns, delays, and 
unforseen expenses, the amount required to 
complete the project and the corresponding funds 
dispursed from loan account, exceeded the fair 
market value of the lots comprising the proJect. 
As a result, the proceeds from the sale of the 
property described in the Trust Deed were not 
sufficient to pay off the loan. (R. 26.) 
While admittedly the affidavits contain little 
information as to the reason why the sums paid for the lot 
-s-
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releases were insufficient to pay off the loan balance,! it is 
inaccurate to say, as defendants do, that "a release price of even 
$5,200.00 per lot would have been more than sufficient to retire 
the loan. The more accurate statement would appear to be 
that if no further advances were made to the defendants, the 
cumulative lot release price would have been sufficient. 
Defendants' misapprehension of the above facts leads to a 
third misstatement: namely, that "Utah Mortgage apparently claims 
that it somehow lost track of the loan balance and released all 
the mortgaged lots before the loan had been paid off." (Brief of 
Defendants-Respondent, p. 6.) The facts as set forth in the 
affidavits are quite the contrary. Far from alleging that they 
lost tracK of the loan balance and inadvertantly released all of 
the remaining lots, the representatives of Utah Mortgage stated 
1 These and other gaps in the facts set forth in the 
affidavits are understandable when one considers that the action 
was commencea only a few weeks prior to defendants' motion. 
Furthermore, neither defendants' Motion nor their Answer sets 
forth their subsequently advanced theory that they had not agreed 
to the release of the lots. Thus, in gathering its affidavits 
Utah Mortgage was left to guess as to the basis for the Summa~y 
Judgment. Since the only "evidence" filed by defendants consisted 
of cert1f ied copies of the Trust Deed and Deed of Reconveyanc~, 
plaintiff's counsel was led to believe that defendants contenaed 
that any release of the collateral (whether consented to or not) 
was ir1Violation of the one-action rule. 
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that "all" of the Black lots were released ccording to the le 
release agreement (R. 30) and that "the pro. eds fron, the sah 
the pr ,,per ty • were not sufficient to P<°'i off the loan." 
26.) U;1less one applies a rather unique interpretation to the 
wora "all" one must conclude that every single lot contained i: 
the Black subdivision was released upon payment by the defendo: 
of the prearranged release price. It follows that defendants' 
characterization of the reason given by Utah Mortgage for 
releasing the lots is totally inaccurate and misleading. 
While it is understandable that def end an ts are not ha, 
with the facts as set forth in the affidavits, for purposes of 
their Summary Judgment defendants must live with them. The 
pertinent facts are these: 
1. utah Mortgage loaned defendants the sum of 
$675,715.00. (R. 25.) 
2. To secure payment of the loan, Utah Mortgage took 
trust deed on the subdivision which defendants were developing. 
(R. 16. J 
3. At or about the time of the execution of the note 
trust deed, defendants agreed with Utah Mortgage that upon the. 
payment of an agreed price, Utah Mortgoge would direct the tru'· 
fro m the Trust Deed so that tr to execute partial reconveyances 
sale of the particulor lot could be completed. (R. 26, 29, JO. 
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4. Because of various cost overruns, delays and 
unforseen expenses, the amount required to complete the project, 
and the corresponding funds dispursed from the loan account 
exceeded the fair market value of the lots comprising the 
proJect. (R. 26.) 
5. The unpaid principal balance of the loan is 
$36,760.01. (R. 25.) 2 
6. All of the lots in the subdivision were released 
pursuant to the lot release agreement between defendants and Utah 
Mortgage. (R. 30.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF REVEALS THE EXISTENCE OF 
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT 
It is universally acknowledgea that summary judgment is 
in appropriate where there exists an unresolved issue at to a 
material fact. Thus, this Court has said: 
2Al though the evidence as to the loan balance is 
uncontradicted, defendants make much of the discrepancy between 
the prayer of the Complaint ($38,467.43) and Mr. Anderson's 
Affidavit ($36.760.01). (See Brief of Defendants-Respondent at 
pp. 1, 3.) While the discrepancy is irrelevant to these 
proceedings, the Court may wish to know that the difference 
represents accrued interest on the loan. 
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A summary jud9'.1ent must be supported bv evi0ence 
admissions anc1 inferences which w},en v·iewed in the 
light most favorable to the loser shows that 
"there is no genuine issue as to any materiai fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of Jaw." Such showing must 
preclude all reasonable possibility that the loser 
could, if given a trial, produce e~idence which 
would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor. 
Bullock v. Desert Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 
U.2d 1, 4-5, 354 P.2d 559, 561 (1960). 
As alluded to in the Statement Facts in this Brief, there are 
significant disputes as to the facts in this case. Thus, unde 
the rule stated above, summary judgment is inappropriate. 
Utah Mortgage's opposition to entry of summary judgme 
below is based upon the fact that the release of the collatw· 
(the lots in the subdivision) was agreed to by the defendan~ 
therefore does not constitute the type of "act or neglect" whi· 
will bar it from suing the borrowers directly. Defendants' 
response to this argument is primarilv in the form of an 
interpretation of the facts as set forth in the Affidavits of 
Messrs. Anderson, Fry and Newman. Thus, as to Utah Mortgage's 
argument that defendants agreed to release of the lots, de~~ 
respond by asserting that (1) such an agreement does not exist 
outside of the Trust Deed (Brief of Defendants-Respondent, P· 
and (2) Utah Mortgage lost track of the number of lots whi~ i 
had released and inadvertently re] eased the remaining lots wif 
obtaining consideration. (.Ii. at PP. 15, 16, 19.) 
-9-
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It should be noted at the outset that defendants' 
arguments are essentially factual rather than legal. To 
reiterate, the so called "facts" upon which defendants rely are 
(1) that there was no release agreement other than that found in 
the Trust Deed and (2) that Utah Mortgage "lost track" of the 
property. As discussed in the Statement of Facts, at best 
defendants' "facts" are disputed by the affidavits; at worst, they 
find no support in the Record. This fact is shown clearly by the 
affidavits of Craig D. Anderson (R. 25\, John D. Fry (R. 29), and 
Robert A. Newman (R. 30) each of which speaks of an agreement by 
which lots in the subdivision were to be released upon payment of 
a specific lot release price. Similarly, Mr. Newman's Affidavit 
clearly states that "all of the Black lots were released in this 
manner." (Id.) There is absolutely nothing in the record to 
indicate that the lots were released by virtue of Utah Mortgage's 
having "lost track" of the number of lots which had been released 
or the amount which had been released from the lot release 
program. It follows that defendants' case for summary judgment is 
based upon disputed or nonexistent facts. Summary Judgment was 
therefore inappropriate. 
POINT II 
THE PROPERTY WAS NOT "LOST" BY VIRTUE OF ANY "ACT 
OR NEGLECT" OF UTAH MORTGAGE 
The parties are in agreement that the law applicable to 
-10-
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this case is set forth in Donaldson v. Grant, 15 u. 231, 49 P, 
(1897) and Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Logan Lodge No. 1453, 
B.P.O.E., 88 U. 577, 56 P.2d 1046 (1936), wherein it is stated 
that where collateral is lost without the fault of the secu~d 
party or where it is not lost because of "act or neglect" of H 
secured party, the creditor is not barred by the one-action ru: 
from proceeding on the note. 15 U. at 241, 49 P. at 781; 88 U! 
at 583, 56 P.2d at 1049. 3 The parties diverge, however, in 
their views as to whether or not in directing the trustee to 
release the lots Utah Mortgage was free of fault or of neglect. 
Defendants take the position that the release of the; 
was a voluntary act by Utah Mortgage and that such a voluntary 
3Defendants suggest the following formulation for the rule: 
[Tlhe mortgagee is relieved from its duty to 
proceed by forclosure only if the property is 
lost through circumstances beyond its control. 
(Brief of Defendants-Respondent, p. 17.) 
This proposed formulation does not appear to. contradict. the ru' 
set forth in Donaldson and Cache Valley Bank1n~ except inso~r 
the reference to "circumstances beyond its control" may imoly' 
higher duty on the part of the creditor than freedom from faul· 
negligence. 
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by its very nature shows neglect and inadvertence. 4 
There are two weaknesses in this agrument -- one factual, 
one legal. First, it is misleading to speak of the partial 
releases of the collateral as a "voluntary act". In point of fact 
Utah Mortgage was contractually bound to release the lots upon 
request by defendants and receipt of payment of the lot release 
price. Whether performance of a contractual obligation is a 
"voluntary act" is simply a semantical game having no relevance to 
the issue at hand. 
Rather than asking whether plaintiff's performance of its 
contractual obligation was "voluntary", this Court should ask 
whether Utah Mortgage's actions were free of negligence or fault, 
i.e., whether it acted reasonably under the circumstances. 
Clearly such a determination is one for the trier of fact and is 
inappropriate for summary judgment. 
Second, the rule of law is that where collateral has been 
released with the consent of the mortgagor, a personal action on 
4"If Utah Mortgage lost the security for its loan 
before that loan was paid off, it did so 
through a voluntary reconveyance of the property, 
not through destruction or prior forclosure. At 
best, Utah Mortgage can claim only that its 
security was lost through its neglect and 
inadvertence. Such a loss can not excus~ a " 
mortgagee from the One-Action Rules requirements. 
(Brief of Defendants-Respondent, p. 12.) 
-12-
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the note is not barred by the one-action rule. 
Company v. State, 32 Cal 194, ]62 P. 647, 648-49 (1916) (Fora 
more complete discussion of this rule, see Brief of Appellant, 
6-9.) 
But even if one assumes that release of the lots was 
"voluntary", and that the lots were released through the "act 
neglect" of Utah Mortgage, it does not follo•,1 that Utah Mortga: 
claim against the defendants is barred by the one-action rule. 
The underlying supposition of defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is that the release of the lots constituted a "loss" 
within the meaning of Q~ald~on and Cache Valley Banking. Thl 
defendants state, "In this case, the security obviously was le 
through the act and neglect of Utah Mortgage." (Brief of 
Defendants-Respondent, p. 8.). But such a theory is inconsis1 
with the policy underlying the one-action rule. The rule was 
adopted for the purpose of protecting the debtor from a 
multiplicity of suits. G. Osborne, Mortgages, § 334 at 701 L 
ea. 1970). Since the statute is designed to protect the debt! 
it follows that the question of whether the collatera] has be' 
"lost" must be approached from the debtor's standpoint. If t' 
collateral has not by the creditor's actions become valueless 
the debtor, it cannot be said that he has suffered a "loss' i 
would bar the creditor's action on the note. 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Furthermore, in order to bar the creditor's recovery the 
alleged negligent action must be the logical cause of the 
collateral's having become valueless. Thus this Court's decision 
in Donaldson v. Grant, ~upra., speaks of loss of the collateral 
"through no fault of the mortgagee". 88 Utah at 583, 56 P.2d at 
104 9. 
In the case at bar these elements are not present. Utah 
Mortgage's partial releases did not render the collateral 
valueless to defendants. On the contrary, in releasing its lien 
on a particular lot Utah Mortgage bestowed value upon it -- value 
which could be immediately realized by defendants by sale of the 
lot. 
Similarly, it is defendants, not Utah Mortgage, which 
have now rendered the property valueless to themselves (and to 
Utah Mortgage) by conveying the property to third parties. It 
follows that the acts attributed to Utah Mortgage by defendants 
did not result in any loss within the meaning of Donaldson and 
Cache Valley Banking. Therefore Utah Mortgage's release of the 
~ collateral does not bar its recovery from defendants. 
t' 
CONCLUSION 
"' Defendants motion for summary judgment is based upon the 
facts which are either disputed or unsupported by the Record. 
These include the allegations that no lot release agreement 
-14-
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existed betwPen the parties and that Utah Mortgage inadverten: 
released a portion of the subdivision lots from the Trust Deel 
without having obtained adequate consideration for the releasE. 
Since the Record is devoid of any facts which substantiate thE 
allegations, the court below erred in granting defendants' 
Motion. Furthermore, even if the facts were as defendants ha•:• 
portrayed them, their Motion should still have been denied sir,: 
they have suffered no loss as a result of the !"elease of the 
collateral. It follows that the lower court's decision shoull 
reversed and remanded. 
DATED this _ii~~ day of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appel 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-1500 
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